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Abstract. Authenticated Di±e-Hellman key exchange allows two prin-
cipals communicating over a public network, and each holding pub-
lic/private keys, to agree on a shared secret value. In this paper we
study the natural extension of this cryptographic problem to a group
of principals. We begin from existing formal security models and re¯ne
them to incorporate major missing details (e.g., strong-corruption and
concurrent sessions). Within this model we de¯ne the execution of a pro-
tocol for authenticated dynamic group Di±e-Hellman and show that it
is provably secure under the decisional Di±e-Hellman assumption. Our
security result holds in the standard model and thus provides better se-
curity guarantees than previously published results in the random oracle
model.
1 Introduction
Authenticated Di±e-Hellman key exchange allows two principals A and B com-
municating over a public network and each holding a pair of matching pub-
lic/private keys to agree on a shared secret value. Protocols designed to deal
with this problem ensure A (B resp.) that no other principals aside from B (A
resp.) can learn any information about this value; the so-called authenticated
key exchange with \implicit" authentication (AKE). These protocols addition-
ally often ensure A and B that their respective partner has actually computed
the shared secret value (i.e. authenticated key exchange with explicit key con-
¯rmation). A natural extension to this protocol problem would be to consider a
scenario wherein a pool of principals agree on a shared secret value. We refer to
this extension as authenticated group Di±e-Hellman key exchange.
Consider scienti¯c collaborations and conferencing applications [5,11], such
as data sharing or electronic notebooks. Applications of this type usually involve
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76SF00098. This document is report LBNL-49087.users aggregated into small groups and often utilize multiple groups running in
parallel. The users share responsibility for parts of tasks and need to coordinate
their e®orts in an environment prone to attacks. To reach this aim, the prin-
cipals need to agree on a secret value to implement secure multicast channels.
Key exchange schemes suited for this kind of application clearly needs to allow
concurrent executions between parties.
We study the problem of authenticated group Di±e-Hellman key exchange
when the group membership is dynamic { principals join and leave the group
at any time { and the adversary may generate cascading changes in the mem-
bership for subsets of principals of his choice. After the initialization phase, and
throughout the lifetime of the multicast group, the principals need to be able
to engage in a conversation after each change in the membership at the end of
which the session key is updated to be sk0. The secret value sk0 should be only
known to the principals in the multicast group during the period when sk0 is the
session key.
(2-party) Di±e-Hellman key exchange protocols also usually achieve the
property of forward-secrecy [15,16] which entails that corruption of a principal's
long-term key does not threaten the security of previously established session
keys. Assuming the ability to erase a secret, some of these protocols achieve
forward-secrecy even if the corruption also releases the principal's internal state
(i.e. strong-corruption [24]). In practice secret erasure is, for example, imple-
mented by hardware devices which use physical security and tamper detection to
not reveal any information [12,22,21,28]. Protocols for group Di±e-Hellman key
exchange need to achieve forward-secrecy even when facing strong-corruption.
Contributions. This paper is the third tier in the formal treatment of the
group Di±e-Hellman key exchange using public/private key pairs. The ¯rst tier
was provided for a scenario wherein the group membership is static [7] and the
second, by extension of the latter for a scenario wherein the group membership
is dynamic [8]. We start from the latter formal model and re¯ne it to add impor-
tant attributes. In the present paper, we model instances of players via oracles
available to the adversary through queries. The queries are available to use at
any time to allow model attacks involving multiple instances of players activated
concurrently and simultaneously by the adversary. In order to model two modes
of corruption, we consider the presence of two cryptographic devices which are
made available to the adversary through queries. Hardware devices are useful
to overcome software limitations however there has thus far been little formal
security analysis [12,23].
The types of crypto-devices and our notion of forward-secrecy leads us to
modi¯cations of existing protocols to obtain a protocol, we refer to it as AKE1
+,
secure against strong corruptions. Due to the very limited computational power
of a smart card chip, smart card is used as an authentication token while a secure
coprocessor is used to carry out the key exchange operations. We show that
within our model the protocol AKE1
+ is secure assuming the decisional Di±e-
Hellman problem and the existence of a pseudo-random function family. Oursecurity theorem does not need a random oracle assumption [4] and thus holds
in the standard model. A proof in the standard model provides better security
guarantees than one in an idealized model of computation [8,7]. Furthermore
we exhibit a security reduction with a much tighter bound than [8], namely we
suppress the exponential factor in the size of the group. Therefore the security
result is meaningful even for large groups. However the protocols are not practical
for groups larger than 100 members.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We ¯rst review the
related work and then introduce the building blocks which we use throughout
the paper. In Section 3, we present our formal model and specify through an
abstract interface the standard functionalities a protocol for authenticated group
Di±e-Hellman key exchange needs to implement. In Section 4, we describe the
protocol AKE1
+ by splitting it down into functions. This helps us to implement
the abstract interface. Finally, in Section 5 we show that the protocol AKE1
+ is
provably secure in the standard model.
Related Work. Several papers [1,10,19,14,27] have extended the 2-party
Di±e-Hellman key exchange [13] to the multi-party setting however a formal
analysis has only been proposed recently. In [8,7], we de¯ned a formal model
for the authenticated (dynamic) group Di±e-Hellman key exchange and proved
secure protocols within this model. We use in both papers an ideal hash func-
tion [4], without dealing with dynamic group changes in [7], or concurrent exe-
cutions of the protocol in [8].
However security can sometimes be compromised even when using a proven
secure protocol: the protocol is incorrectly implemented or the model is insuf-
¯cient. Cryptographic protocols assume, and do not usually explicitly state,
that secrets are de¯nitively and reliably erased (only the most recent secrets
are kept) [12,18]. Only recently formal models have been re¯ned to incorpo-
rate the cryptographic action of erasing a secret, and thus protocols achieving
forward-secrecy in the strong-corruption sense have been proposed [3,24].
Protocols for group Di±e-Hellman key exchange [7] achieve the property
of forward-secrecy in the strong-corruption sense assuming that \ephemeral"
private keys are erased upon completion of a protocol run. However protocols
for dynamic group Di±e-Hellman key exchange [8] do not, since they reuse the
\ephemeral" keys to update the session key. Fortunately, these \ephemeral" keys
can be embedded in some hardware cryptographic devices which are at least as
good as erasing a secret [22,21,28].
2 Basic Building Blocks
We ¯rst introduce the pseudo-random function family and the intractability
assumptions.Message Authentication Code. A Message Authentication Code MAC=
(MAC.Sgn,MAC.Vf) consists of the following two algorithms (where the key
space is uniformly distributed) [2]:
{ The authentication algorithm MAC.Sgn which, on a message m and a key
K as input, outputs a tag ¹. We write ¹ Ã MAC.Sgn(K;m). The pair
(m;¹) is called an authenticated message.
{ The veri¯cation algorithm MAC.Vf which, on an authenticated message
(m;¹) and a key K as input, checks whether ¹ is a valid tag on m with
respect to K. We write True=False Ã MAC.Vf(K;m;¹).
A (t;q;L;²)-MAC-forger is a probabilistic Turing machine F running in time
t that requests a MAC.Sgn-oracle up to q messages each of length at most
L, and outputs an authenticated message (m0;¹0), without having queried the
MAC.Sgn-oracle on message m0, with probability at least ². We denote this
success probability as Succ
cma
mac(t;q;L), where CMA stands for (adaptive) Chosen-
Message Attack. The MAC scheme is (t;q;L;²)-CMA-secure if there is no
(t;q;L;²)-MAC-forger.
Group Decisional Di±e-Hellman Assumption (G-DDH). Let G =< g >
be a cyclic group of prime order q and n an integer. Let In be f1;:::;ng, P(In)
be the set of all subsets of In and ¡ be a subset of P(In) such that In = 2 ¡.
We de¯ne the Group Di±e-Hellman distribution relative to ¡ as:
G-DH¡ =
½³
J;g
Q
j2J xj
´
J2¡
j x1;:::;xn 2R Zq
¾
:
Given ¡, a (T;²)-G-DDH¡-distinguisher for G is a probabilistic Turing machine
¢ running in time T that given an element X from either G-DH
$
¡, where the
tuple of G-DH¡ is appended a random element gr, or G-DH
?
¡, where the tuple is
appended gx1:::xn, outputs 0 or 1 such that:
¯ ¯ ¯Pr
£
¢(X) = 1jX 2 G-DH
$
¡
¤
¡ Pr
£
¢(X) = 1jX 2 G-DH
?
¡
¤¯ ¯ ¯ ¸ ²:
We denote this di®erence of probabilities by Advgddh¡
G (¢). The G-DDH¡ prob-
lem is (T;²)-intractable if there is no (T;²)-G-DDH¡-distinguisher for G.
If ¡ = P(I)nfIng, we say that G-DH¡ is the Full Generalized Di±e-Hellman
distribution [6,20,26]. Note that if n = 2, we get the classical DDH problem, for
which we use the straightforward notation Advddh
G (¢).
Lemma 1. The DDH assumption implies the G-DDH assumption.
Proof. Steiner, Tsudik and Waidner proved it in [26]. u tMulti Decisional Di±e-Hellman Assumption (M-DDH). We introduce
a new decisional assumption, based on the Di±e-Hellman assumption. Let us
de¯ne the Multi Di±e-Hellman M-DH and the Random Multi Di±e-Hellman
M-DH
$ distributions of size n as:
M-DHn =
©¡
fgxig1·i·n;fgxixjg1·i<j·n
¢
jx1;:::;xn 2R Zq
ª
M-DH
$
n =
©¡
fgxig1·i·n;fgrj;kg1·j<k·n
¢
jxi;rj;k 2R Zq;8i;1 · j < k · n
ª
:
A (T;²)-M-DDHn-distinguisher for G is a probabilistic Turing machine ¢ running
in time T that given an element X of either M-DHn or M-DH
$
n outputs 0 or 1
such that:
¯ ¯ ¯Pr[¢(X) = 1jX 2 M-DHn] ¡ Pr[¢(X) = 1jX 2 M-DH
$
n]
¯ ¯ ¯ ¸ ²:
We denote this di®erence of probabilities by Advmddhn
G (¢). The M-DDHn prob-
lem is (T;²)-intractable if there is no (T;²)-M-DDHn-distinguisher for G.
Lemma 2. For any group G and any integer n, the M-DDHn problem can be
reduced to the DDH problem and we have: Advmddhn
G (T) · n2Advddh
G (T).
3 Model
In this section, we model instances of players via oracles available to the ad-
versary through queries. These oracle queries provide the adversary a capability
to initialize a multicast group via Setup-queries, add players to the multicast
group via Join-queries, and remove players from the multicast group via Re-
move-queries. By making these queries available to the adversary at any time we
provide him an ability to generate concurrent membership changes. We also take
into account hardware devices and model their interaction with the adversary
via queries.
Players. We ¯x a nonempty set U of N players that can participate in a group
Di±e-Hellman key exchange protocol P. A player Ui 2 U can have many in-
stances called oracles involved in distinct concurrent executions of P. We denote
instance t of player Ui as ¦t
i with t 2 N. Also, when we mean a not ¯xed member
of U we use U without any index and denote an instance of U as ¦t
U with t 2 N.
For each concurrent execution of P, we consider a nonempty subset I of U
called the multicast group. And in I, the group controller GC(I) initiates the
addition of players to the multicast group or the removal of players from the
multicast group. The group controller is trusted to do only this.
In a multicast group I of size n, we denote by Ii, for i = 1;:::;n, the
index of the player related to the i-th instance involved in this group. This
i-th instance is furthermore denoted by ¦(I;i). Therefore, for any index i 2
f1;:::;ng, ¦(I;i) = ¦t
Ii 2 I for some t.
Each player U holds a long-lived key LLU which is a pair of matching pub-
lic/private keys. LLU is speci¯c to U not to one of its instances.Abstract Interface. We de¯ne the basic structure of a group Di±e-Hellman
protocol. A group Di±e-Hellman scheme GDH consists of four algorithms:
{ The key generation algorithm GDH.KeyGen(1`) is a probabilistic algorithm
which on input of a security parameter 1`, provides each player in U with a
long-lived key LLU. The structure of LLU depends on the particular scheme.
The three other algorithms are interactive multi-party protocols between players
in U, which provide each principal in the new multicast group with a new session
key SK.
{ The setup algorithm GDH.Setup(J), on input of a set of instances of players
J, creates a new multicast group I, and sets it to J.
{ The remove algorithm GDH.Remove(I;J) creates a new multicast group
I and sets it to InJ.
{ The join algorithm GDH.Join(I;J) creates a new multicast group I, and
sets it to I [ J.
An execution of P consists of running the GDH.KeyGen algorithm once, and
then many concurrent executions of the three other algorithms. We will also use
the term operation to mean one of the algorithms: GDH.Setup, GDH.Remove
or GDH.Join.
Security Model. The security de¯nitions for P take place in the following
game. In this game Game
ake(A;P), the adversary A plays against the players
in order to defeat the security of P. The game is initialized by providing coin
tosses to GDH.KeyGen(¢), A, any oracle ¦t
U; and GDH.KeyGen(1`) is run to
set up players' LL-key. A bit b is as well °ipped to be later used in the Test-query
(see below). The adversary A is then given access to the oracles and interacts
with them via the queries described below. We now explain the capabilities that
each kind of query captures:
Instance Oracle Queries. We de¯ne the oracle queries as the interactions between
A and the oracles only. These queries model the attacks an adversary could
mount through the network.
{ Send(¦t
U;m): This query models A sending messages to instance oracles. A
gets back from his query the response which ¦t
U would have generated in
processing message m according to P.
{ Setup(J);Remove(I;J);Join(I;J): These queries model adversary A ini-
tiating one of the operations GDH.Setup, GDH.Remove or GDH.Join.
Adversary A gets back the °ow initiating the execution of the corresponding
operation.
{ Reveal(¦t
U): This query models the attacks resulting in the loss of session
key computed by oracle ¦t
U; it is only available to A if oracle ¦t
U has com-
puted its session key SK¦t
U. A gets back SK¦t
U which is otherwise hidden.
When considering the strong-corruption model (see Section 5), this query
also reveals the °ows that have been exchanged between the oracle and the
secure coprocessor.{ Test(¦t
U): This query models the semantic security of the session key SK¦t
U.
It is asked only once in the game, and is only available if oracle ¦t
U is Fresh
(see below). If b = 0, a random `-bit string is returned; if b = 1, the session
key is returned. We use this query to de¯ne A's advantage.
Secure Coprocessor Queries. The adversary A interacts with the secure copro-
cessors by making the following two queries.
{ Sendc(¦t
U;m): This query models A directly sending and receiving messages
to the secure coprocessor. A gets back from his query the response which
the secure coprocessor would have generated in processing message m. The
adversary could directly interact with the secure coprocessor in a variety of
ways: for instance, the adversary may have broken into a computer without
being detected (e.g., bogus softwares, trojan horses and viruses).
{ Corruptc(¦t
U): This query models A having access to the private memory of
the device. A gets back the internal data stored on the secure coprocessor.
This query can be seen as an attack wherein A gets physical access to a secure
coprocessor and bypasses the tamper detection mechanism [29]. This query
is only available to the adversary when considering the strong-corruption
model (see Section 5). The Corruptc-query also reveals the °ows the secure
coprocessor and the smart card have exchanged.
Smart Card Queries. The adversary A interacts with the smart cards by making
the two following queries.
{ Sends(U;m): This query models A sending messages to the smart card and
receiving messages from the smart card.
{ Corrupts(U): This query models the attacks in which the adversary gets
access to the smart card and gets back the player's LL-key. This query
models attacks like di®erential power analysis or other attacks by which the
adversary bypasses the tamper detection mechanisms of the smart card [29].
When A terminates, it outputs a bit b0. We say that A wins the AKE game (see
in Section 5) if b = b0. Since A can trivially win with probability 1/2, we de¯ne
A's advantage by Adv
ake
P (A) = 2 £ Pr[b = b0] ¡ 1.
4 An Authenticated Group Di±e-Hellman Scheme
In this section, we describe the protocol AKE1
+ by splitting it into functions
that help us to implement the GDH abstract interface. These functions specify
how certain cryptographic transformations have to be performed and abstract
out the details of the devices (software or hardware) that will carry out the
transformations. In the following we identify the multicast group to the set of
indices of players (instances of players) in it. We use a security parameter ` and,
to make the description easier see a player Ui not involved in the multicast group
as if his private exponent xi were equal to 1.4.1 Overview
The protocol AKE1
+ consists of the Setup1
+, Remove1
+ and Join1
+ algorithms.
As illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and 3, in AKE1
+ the players are arranged in a ring
and the instance with the highest-index in the multicast group I is the group
controller GC(I): GC(I) = ¦(I;n) = ¦t
In for some t. This is also a protocol
wherein each instance saves the set of values it receives in the down-°ow of
Setup1
+, Remove1
+ and Join1
+1.
The session-key space SK associated with the protocol AKE1
+ is f0;1g`
equipped with a uniform distribution. The arithmetic is in a group G =< g > of
prime order q in which the DDH assumption holds. The key generation algorithm
GDH.KeyGen(1`) outputs ElGamal-like LL-keys LLi = (si;gsi).
4.2 Authentication Functions
The authentication mechanism supports the following functions:
{ Auth Key Derive(i;j). This function derives a secret value Kij between
Ui and Uj. In our protocol, Kij = F1(gsisj), where the map F1 is speci¯ed
in Section 4.4. (Kij is never exposed.)
{ Auth Sig(i;j;m). This function invokes MAC.Sgn(Kij;m) to obtain tag
¹, which is returned.
{ Auth Ver(i;j;m;¹). This function invokes MAC.Vf(Kij;m;¹) to check if
(m;¹) is correct w.r.t. key Kij. The boolean answer is returned.
The two latter functions should of course be called after initializing Kij via
Auth Key Derive(¢).
4.3 Key-Exchange Functions
The key-exchange mechanism supports the following functions:
{ Gdh Picks(i). This function generates a new private exponent xi
R Ã Z?
q.
Recall that xi is never exposed.
{ Gdh Picks
?(i). This function invokes Gdh Picks(i) to generate xi but do
not delete the previous private exponent x0
i. x0
i is only deleted when explicitly
asked for by the instance.
{ Gdh Up(i;j;k;Fl;¹). First, if j > 0, the authenticity of tag ¹ on message
Fl is checked with Auth Ver(j;i;Fl;¹). Second, Fl is decoded as a set of
intermediate values (I;Y;Z) where I is the multicast group and
Y =
[
m6=i
©
Z1=xmª
with Z = gxt:
1 In the subsequent removal of players from the multicast group any oracle ¦ could
be selected as the group controller GC and so will need these values to execute
Remove1
+.The values in Y are raised to the power of xi and then concatenated with Z
to obtain these intermediate values
Y 0 =
[©
Z01=xmª
, where Z0 = Zxi = gxt:
Third, Fl
0 = (I;Y 0;Z0) is authenticated, by invoking Auth Sig(i;k;Fl
0) to
obtain tag ¹0. The °ow (Fl
0;¹0) is returned.
{ Gdh Down(i;j;Fl;¹). First, the authenticity of (Fl;¹) is checked, by invok-
ing Auth Ver(j;i;Fl;¹). Then the °ow Fl
0 is computed as in Gdh Up, from
Fl = (I;Y;Z) but without the last element Z0 (i.e. Fl
0 = (I;Y 0)). Finally, the
°ow Fl
0 is appended tags ¹1, ..., ¹n by invoking Auth Sig(i;k;Fl
0), where
k ranges in I. The tuple (Fl
0;¹1;:::;¹n) is returned.
{ Gdh Up Again(i;k;Fl = (I;Y 0)). From Y 0 and the previous random x0
i,
one can recover the associated Z0. In this tuple (Y 0;Z0), one replaces the
occurrences of the old random x0
i by the new one xi (by raising some elements
to the power xi=x0
i) to obtain Fl
0. The latter is authenticated by computing
via Auth Sig(i;k;Fl
0) the tag ¹. The °ow (Fl
0;¹0) is returned. From now
the old random x0
i is no longer needed and, thus, can be erased.
{ Gdh Down Again(i;Fl = (I;Y 0)). In Y 0, one replaces the occurrences of
the old random x0
i by the new one xi, to obtain Fl
0. This °ow is appended
tags ¹1, ..., ¹n by invoking Auth Sig(i;k;Fl
0), where k ranges in I. The
tuple (Fl
0;¹1;:::;¹n) is returned. From now the old random x0
i is no longer
needed and, thus, can be erased.
{ Gdh Key(i;j;Fl;¹) produces the session key sk. First, the authenticity of
(Fl;¹) is checked with Auth Ver(j;i;Fl;¹). Second, the value ® = g
Q
j2I xj
is computed from the private exponent xi, and the corresponding value in
Fl. Third, sk is de¯ned to be F2(IkFlk®), where the map F2(¢) is de¯ned
below.
4.4 Key Derivation Functions
The key derivation functions F1 and F2 are implemented via the so-called \entro-
py-smoothing" property. We use the left-over-hash lemma to obtain (almost)
uniformly distributed values over f0;1g`.
Lemma 3 (Left-Over-Hash Lemma [17]). Let Ds : f0;1gs be a probabilistic
space with entropy at least ¾. Let e be an integer and ` = ¾¡2e. Let h : f0;1gk£
f0;1gs ! f0;1g` be a universal hash function. Let r 2U f0;1gk, x 2Ds f0;1gs
and y 2U f0;1g`. Then the statistical distance ± is:
±(hr(x)kr;ykr) · 2¡(e+1):
Any universal hash function can be used in the above lemma, provided that y is
uniformly distributed over f0;1g`. However, in the security analysis, we need an
additional property from h. This property states that the distribution fhr(®)g®
is computationally undistinguishable from the uniform one, for any r. Indeed, weneed there is no \bad" parameter r, since such a parameter may be chosen by
the adversary.
The map F1(¢) is implemented as follows through public certi¯ed random
strings. In a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), each player Ui is given N ¡ 1
random strings frijgj6=i each of length k when registering his identity with a
Certi¯cation Authority (CA). Recall that N = jUj. The random string rij = rji
is used by Ui and Uj to derivate from input value x a symmetric-key Kij =
F1(x) = hrij(x).
The map F2(¢) is implemented as follows. First, Gdh Down(¢) is enhanced in
such a way that it also generates a random value r® 2 f0;1gk, which is included
in the subsequent broadcast. Then, player Ui derives from input value x a session
key sk = F2(x) = hr®(x).
One may note that in both cases, the random values are used only once,
which gives almost uniformly and independently distributed values, according
to the lemma 3.
4.5 Scheme
We correctly deal with concurrent sessions running in an adversary-controlled
network by creating a new instance for each player in a multicast group. We in
e®ect create an instance of a player via the algorithm Setup1
+ and then create
new instances of this player through the algorithms Join1
+ and Remove1
+.
Setup1
+(I): This algorithm consists of two stages, up-°ow and down-°ow (see
Figure 1). On the up-°ow oracle ¦(I;i) invokes Gdh Picks(Ii) to generate
its private exponent xIi and then invokes Gdh Up(Ii;Ii¡1;Ii+1;Fli¡1;¹i¡1;i)
to obtain both °ow Fli and tag ¹i;i+1 (by convention, I0 = 0, Fl0 = Ikg and
¹0;i = ;). Then, ¦(I;i) forwards (Fli;¹i;i+1) to the next oracle in the ring. The
down-°ow takes place when GC(I) receives the last up-°ow. Upon receiving this
°ow, GC(I) invokes Gdh Picks(In) and Gdh Down(In;In¡1;Fln¡1;¹n¡1;n)
to compute both Fln and the tags ¹1;:::;¹n. GC(I) broadcasts (Fln;¹1;:::;¹n).
Finally, each oracle ¦(I;i) invokes Gdh Key(Ii;In;Fln;¹i) and gets back the
session key SK¦(I;i).
Remove1
+(I;J): This algorithm consists of a down-°ow only (see Figure 2).
The group controller GC(I) of the new set I = InJ invokes Gdh Picks
?(In) to
get a new private exponent and then Gdh Down Again(In;Fl
0) where Fl
0 is the
saved previous broadcast. GC(I) obtains a new set of intermediate values from
which it deletes the elements related to the removed players (in the set J) and
updates the multicast group. This produces the new broadcast °ow Fln. Upon
receiving the down-°ow, ¦(I;i) invokes Gdh Key(Ii;In;Fln;¹i) and gets back
the session key SK¦(I;i). Here, is the reason why an oracle must store its private
exponent and only erase its internal data when it leaves the group.Join1
+(I;J): This algorithm consists of two stages, up-°ow and down-°ow (see
Figure 3). On the up-°ow the group controller GC(I) invokes Gdh Picks
?(In),
and then Gdh Up Again(In;j;Fl
0) where Fl
0;j are respectively the saved pre-
vious broadcast and the index of the ¯rst joining player. One updates I, and
forwards the result to the ¯rst joining player. From that point in the execution,
the protocol works as the algorithm Setup1
+, where the group controller is the
highest index player in J.
4.6 Practical Considerations
When implementors choose a protocol, they take into account its security but
also its ease of integration. For a minimal disruption to a current security in-
frastructure, it is possible to modify AKE1
+ so that it does not use public certi-
¯ed random strings. In this variant, the key derivation functions are both seen
as ideal functions (i.e. the output of F1(¢) and F2(¢) are uniformly distributed
over f0;1g`) and are instantiated using speci¯c functions derivated from cryp-
tographic hash functions like SHA-1 or MD5. The analogue of Theorem 1 in
the random oracle model can then easily be proven from the security proof of
AKE1
+.
Smart
S 1 S 2 Cards S 3 S 4
holds s1 holds s2 holds s3 holds s4
l l l l
Secure
C 1 C 2 Coprocessors C 3 C 4
x1Ãgdh picks(1) x2Ãgdh picks(2) x3Ãgdh picks(3) x4Ãgdh picks(4)
l l l l
Players
U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4
gdh up(1; 0; 2; Ikg; ;)
(Fl1;¹12)
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ !
gdh up(2; 1; 3; Fl1; ¹12)
(Fl2;¹23)
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ !
gdh up(3; 2; 4; Fl2; ¹23)
(Fl3;¹34)
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ !
gdh down(4; 3; Fl3; ¹34)
U4 broadcasts (Fl4; ¹41; ¹42; ¹43; ¹44) Ã ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
Ã ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
Ã ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
gdh key(1; Fl4; ¹41) gdh key(2; Fl4; ¹42) gdh key(3; Fl4; ¹43) gdh key(4; Fl4; ¹44)
Fig.1. Algorithm Setup1
+. A practical example with 4 players I = fU1;U2;U3;U4g.
5 Analysis of Security
In this section, we assert that the protocol AKE1
+ securely distributes a session
key. We re¯ne the notion of forward-secrecy to take into account two modes of
corruption and use it to de¯ne two notions of security. We exhibit a security
reduction for AKE1
+ that holds in the standard model.Smart
S 1 S 2 Cards S 3 S 4
holds s1 holds s2 holds s3 holds s4
l l l l
Secure
C 1 C 2 Coprocessors C 3 C 4
holds x1 2 Z?
q holds x2 2 Z?
q holds x3 2 Z?
q holds x4 2 Z?
q
x0
3Ãgdh picks?(3)
l l l l
Players
U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4
Previous set of values is Fl4 = fI; gx2x3x4; gx1x3x4; gx1x2x4; gx1x2x3g
gdh down again(3; Fl4)
(Fl0
3;¹31;¹33)
Ã ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
New set of values is Fl0
3 = fInJ; g
x0
3
24 ; g
x1
24 g; where g24 = gx2x4
gdh key(1; Fl0
3; ¹31) gdh key(3; Fl0
3; ¹33)
Fig.2. Algorithm Remove1
+. A practical example with 4 players: I = fU1;U2;U3;U4g
and J = fU2;U4g. The new multicast group is I = fU1;U3g and GC = U3.
5.1 Security Notions
Forward-Secrecy. The notion of forward-secrecy entails that the corruption
of a (static) LL-key used for authentication does not compromise the semantic
security of previously established session keys. However while a corruption may
have exposed the static key of a player it may have also exposed the player's
internal data. That is either the LL-key or the ephemeral key (private exponent)
used for session key establishment is exposed, or both. This in turn leads us
to de¯ne two modes of corruption: the weak-corruption model and the strong-
corruption model.
In the weak-corruption model, a corruption only reveals the LL-key of player
U. That is, the adversary has the ability to make Corrupts queries. We then talk
about weak-forward secrecy and refer to it as wfs. In the strong-corruption model,
a corruption will reveal the LL-key of U and additionally all internal data that
his instances did not explicitly erase. That is, the adversary has the ability to
make Corrupts and Corruptc queries. We then talk about strong-forward secrecy
and refer to it as fs.
Freshness. As it turns out from the de¯nition of forward-secrecy two °avors
of freshness show up. An oracle ¦t
U is wfs-Fresh, in the current execution, (or
holds a wfs-Fresh SK) if the following conditions hold. First, no Corrupts query
has been made by the adversary since the beginning of the game. Second, in
the execution of the current operation, U has accepted and neither U nor his
partners has been asked for a Reveal-query.
An oracle ¦t
U is fs-Fresh, in the current execution, (or holds a fs-Fresh SK)
if the following conditions hold. First, neither a Corrupts-query nor a Corruptc-
query has been made by the adversary since the beginning of the game. Second,
in the execution of the current operation, U has accepted and neither U nor his
partners have been asked for a Reveal-query.Smart
S 1 S 2 Cards S 3 S 4
holds s1 holds s2 holds s3 holds s4
l l l l
Secure
C 1 C 2 Coprocessors C 3 C 4
holds x1 2 Z?
q holds x2 2 Z?
q holds x3 2 Z?
q
x00
3 Ãgdh picks?(3) x0
4Ãgdh picks(4)
l l l l
Players
U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4
Previous set of values is Fl0
3 = fI; gx2x0
3x4; gx1x2x4g
gdh up again(3; 4; Fl0
3; ¹0
33)
(Fl00
3 ;¹00
34)
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ !
gdh down(4; 3; Fl00
3 ; ¹00
34)
U4 broadcasts (Fl0
4; ¹0
41; ¹43; ¹44) Ã ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
Ã ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
New set of values is Fl0
4 = fI [ J; g
x00
3 x0
4
24 ; g
x1x0
4
24 ; g
x1x00
3
24 g; where g24 = gx2x4
gdh key(1; Fl0
4; ¹41) gdh key(3; Fl0
4; ¹43) gdh key(4; Fl0
4; ¹44)
Fig.3. Algorithm Join1
+. A practical example with 4 players: I = fU1;U3g, J = fU4g
and GC = U3. The new multicast group is I = fU1;U3;U4g.
AKE Security. In an execution of P, we say an adversary A wins if she asks a
single Test-query to a Fresh player U and correctly guesses the bit b used in the
game Game
ake(A;P). We denote the AKE advantage as Adv
ake
P (A). Protocol P
is an A-secure AKE if Adv
ake
P (A) is negligible.
By notation Adv(t;:::), we mean the maximum values of Adv(A), over all
adversaries A that expend at most the speci¯ed amount of resources (namely
time t).
5.2 Security Theorem
A theorem asserting the security of some protocol measures how much computa-
tion and interactions helps the adversary. One sees that AKE1
+ is a secure AKE
protocol provided that the adversary does not solve the group decisional Di±e-
Hellman problem G-DDH, does not solve the multi-decisional Di±e-Hellman
problem M-DDH, or forges a Message Authentication Code MAC. These terms
can be made negligible by appropriate choice of parameters for the group G.
The other terms can also be made \negligible" by an appropriate instantiation
of the key derivation functions.
Theorem 1. Let A be an adversary against protocol P, running in time T,
allowed to make at most Q queries, to any instance oracle. Let n be the number
of players involved in the operations which lead to the group on which A makes
the Test-query. Then we have:
Adv
ake
P (A;qse) · 2nQ ¢ Adv
gddh¡n
G (T 0) + 2Advmddhn
G (T)
+n(n ¡ 1) ¢ Succ
cma
mac(T) + n(n ¡ 1) ¢ ±1 + 2nQ ¢ ±2where ±i denotes the distance between the output of Fi(¢) and the uniform distri-
bution over f0;1g`, T0 · T +QnTexp(k), where Texp(k) is the time of computa-
tion required for an exponentiation modulo a k-bit number, and ¡n corresponds
to the elements adversary A can possibly view:
¡n =
[
2·j·n¡2
ffij1 · i · j;i 6= lg j1 · l · jg
[
ffij1 · i · n;i 6= k;lg j1 · k;l · ng:
Proof. The formal proof of the theorem is omitted due to lack of space and can
be found in the full version of this paper [9]. We do, however, provide a sketch
of the proof here.
Let the notation G0 refer to Game
ake(A;P). Let b and b0 be de¯ned as in
Section 3 and S0 be the event that b = b0. We incrementally de¯ne a sequence of
games starting at G0 and ending up at G5. We de¯ne in the execution of Gi¡1
and Gi a certain \bad" event Ei and show that as long as Ei does not occur the
two games are identical [25]. The di±culty is in choosing the \bad" event. We
then show that the advantage of A in breaking the AKE security of P can be
bounded by the probability that the \bad" events happen. We now de¯ne the
games G1;G2;G3;G4;G5. Let Si be the event b = b0 in game Gi.
Game G1 is the same as game G0 except we abort if a MAC forgery occurs
before any Corrupt-query. We de¯ne the MAC forgery event by Forge. We then
show: jPr[S0] ¡ Pr[S1]j · Pr[Forge].
Lemma 4. Let ±1 be the distance between the output of the map F1 and the uni-
form distribution. Then, we have (proof appears in full version of the paper [9]):
Pr[Forge] · Advmddhn
G (T) +
n(n ¡ 1)
2
Succ
cma
mac(T) +
n(n ¡ 1)
2
±1:
Game G2 is the same as game G1 except that we add the following rule: we
choose at random an index i0 in [1;n] and an integer c0 in [1;Q]. If the Test-
query does not occur at the c0-th operation, or if the very last broadcast °ow
before the Test-query is not operated by player i0, the simulator outputs \Fail"
and sets b0 randomly. Let E2 be the event that these guesses are not correct. We
show: Pr[S2] = Pr[E2]=2 + Pr[S1](1 ¡ Pr[E2]), where Pr[E2] = 1 ¡ 1=nQ.
Game G3 is the same as game G2 except that we modify the way the queries
made by A are answered; the simulator's input is D, a G-DH
?
¡n element, with
gx1:::xn. During the attack, based on the two values i0 and c0, the simulator
injects terms from the instance such that the Test-ed key is derived from the
G-DH-secret value relative to that instance. The simulator appears in the full
version of the paper: brie°y, the simulator is responsible for embedding (by
random self-reducibility) in the protocol the elements of the instance D so that
the Test-ed key is derived from gx1:::xn. We then show that: Pr[S2] = Pr[S3].Game G4 is the same as game G3 except that the simulator is given as input an
element D from G-DH
$
¡n, with gr. And in case b = 1, the value random value gr is
used to answer the Test-query. The, the di®erence between G3 and G4 is upper-
bounded by the computational distance between the two distributions G-DH
?
¡n
and G-DH
$
¡n: jPr[S3] ¡ Pr[S4]j · Adv
gddh¡n
G (T 0); where T 0 takes into account
the running time of the adversary, and the random self-reducibility operations,
and thus T 0 · T + QnTexp(k).
Game G5 is the same as G4, except that the Test-query is answered with
a completely random value, independent of b. It is then straightforward that
Pr[S5] = 1=2. Let ±2 be the distance between the output of F2(¢) and the uniform
distribution, we have: jPr[S5] ¡ Pr[S4]j · ±2.
The theorem then follows from putting altogether the above equations. u t
6 Conclusion
This paper represents the third tier in the treatment of the group Di±e-Hellman
key exchange using public/private keys. The ¯rst tier was provided for a sce-
nario wherein the group membership is static [7] and the second, by extension
of the latter to support membership changes [8]. This paper adds important
attributes (strong-corruption, concurrent executions of the protocol, tighter re-
duction, standard model) to the group Di±e-Hellman key exchange.
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